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CASES NOTED
tices are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused or the business purpose for their use. The rule of reason,
however, calls for a balancing of the various harms occasioned to the
public against the benefits likely to result from the activity. The test
of the legality of a practice under the rule of reason is whether the
effect upon competition in the marketplace is substantially ad-
verse." A court might conclude, for instance, that the greater public
awareness of the availability of legal services, resulting from adver-
tising and solicitation, may outweigh the various evils threatened by
these activities, and forbid the bans to continue.
Thus, even though fee schedules are not immune from Sherman
Act scrutiny, it remains to be seen whether the professional bans on
solicitation and advertising will survive. If not, then it is likely that
the economics, as well as the nature and character of the practice
of law, will change dramatically.
ROBERT CORY SCHNEPPER
Compelling State Interest Test Applied to Denial
of Rezoning Request
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. ("Metropolitan"),
organized for the purpose of developing low and moderate income
housing, acquired a vacant 15-acre parcel for a proposed 190-unit,
federally subsidized, townhouse development in the village of Ar-
lington Heights, a suburb of Chicago. The property was part of an
80-acre parcel belonging to a Catholic religious order which had its
novitiate and high school thereon. The larger parcel had always
been zoned R-3, single-family, and was surrounded by single-family
homes.' The proposed townhouses would require a rezoning of the
15-acre parcel to R-5, multifamily. Metropolitan took the necessary
administrative steps to obtain that rezoning. The village's Plan
Commission, after holding public hearings, recommended against
the rezoning as, under its comprehensive plan, rezoning to R-5
52. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
1. The religious order's use of the land was a pre-existing, nonconforming use at the time
the first zoning ordinance went into effect in 1959.
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should only be permitted if the area represents a buffer zone be-
tween a single-family zone and a commercial or other high intensity
zone. The board of trustees of the village, therefore, denied the
rezoning request.
Alleging that the refusal to rezone perpetuated segregation and
thereby violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment,' Metropolitan, and a number of individual plaintiffs3
seeking to represent a class of moderate income minority members
2. Plaintiffs also alleged that the denial of the rezoning request violated the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1970); the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970); and the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (1970). However, the court's
decision is based solely on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
3. Whether Metropolitan and the individual plaintiffs had standing to bring this action
was an issue not addressed by the appellate court. The trial court raised the issue but did
not decide it. It merely assumed that the corporate plaintiff had sufficient interest in the
property to have the requisite standing; but, on the basis of class action requirements, the
court indicated that the individual plaintiffs did not have standing. Nevertheless, the court
stated that, "[slince we intend to decide this issue on its merits, we see no purpose to be
served by debating the question of standing any further." Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp.
v. Village of Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp. 208, 210 (N.D. I1. 1974).
It is questionable whether the individual plaintiffs would have standing, notwithstanding
the class action question, under the most recent Supreme Court ruling on that issue. Warth
v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197 (1975), held that, "a plaintiff who seeks to challenge exclusionary
zoning practices must allege specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged prac-
tices harm him, and that he personally would benefit in a tangible way from the courts'
intervention." 95 S. Ct. at 2210 (emphasis in the original). In distinguishing a number of lower
court cases involving specific housing projects, the Warth Court indicated that intended
residents of such projects would have standing to challenge applicable zoning restrictions
because they could show harm to their immediate and personal interests. The record in
Metropolitan Housing does not indicate whether the individual plaintiffs were "intended
residents" of the proposed project. Certainly the class those plaintiffs sought to represent,
all moderate income minority members who could not find decent affordable housing in
Arlington Heights, was intended to encompass a considerably larger group than those in-
tended residents of the proposed project. An application of Worth to such a class, therefore,
would likely result in a denial of standing. A redefining of the class to include only the
intended minority residents of the proposed project might rectify the difficulty.
If the individual plaintiffs' standing had been denied, could Metropolitan have raised
the equal protection issue alone? Arguably it could on the basis of Barrows v. Jackson, 346
U.S. 249 (1953). Barrows involved a white home owner who tried to sell her property to a non-
Caucasian in violation of a restrictive covenant. In the suit for damages by neighboring
homeowners, she was permitted to raise the equal protection issue, even though it involved
the rights of persons not before the Court. On the other hand, in Warth, the Court noted
that when an individual or association is asserting the legal rights of a third party, it is within
a court's "prudential authority" to deny these plaintiffs access to the courts, 95 S. Ct. at 2213.
If Warth is to be an indication of the difficulty of obtaining standing to challenge exclusionary
zoning practices in the future, it is hoped that such "prudential authority" will be exercised
sparingly in order that the merits of these cases might be heard. For a full discussion of Warth
see the note on that decision appearing in this issue, supra at 453.
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who could not find decent affordable housing in Arlington Heights,4
brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois against the village to, in effect, force it to rezone
the 15-acre parcel. The district court denied the plaintiffs any relief,
holding that the refusal to rezone was based on good faith reasons5
and had no racially discriminatory effect.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held, reversed and remanded: (1) Arlington Heights' denial
of the rezoning request had racially discriminatory effects and could
be upheld only upon a showing of compelling public interest; (2)
maintaining the integrity of the buffer policy and protecting the
values of the neighboring property did not constitute a compelling
public interest; and therefore, (3) the village's action violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517
F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975).
For five decades, zoning in the courts has been dominated by
one Supreme Court decision- Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co.' Euclid required that, in order to attack a zoning ordinance on
constitutional grounds, there must be a showing that the ordinance
was "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial rela-
tion to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." 7 The
judicial attitude in zoning matters, therefore, became one of defer-
ence to the judgment of local administrators and legislative bodies,'
affirming whatever choice the locality made without investigating
4. The class action issue, like the standing issue, was not addressed by the appellate
court. The trial court, however, treated the two issues as one, indicating that, although it
would decide the case on its merits, it did not feel the individual plaintiffs represented a
definable or manageable class. "Manageability," however, is a standard required for a
23(b)(3) class under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and not for a 23(b)(2) class, which
the plaintiffs sought to represent. See 7A WRIGHT AND MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE: Civii. §§ 1775-76 (1972).
5. Those reasons, according to the district court, were (1) the integrity of the zoning plan
(buffer policy), (2) the protection of the value of surrounding property (which, the court
found, would be substantially decreased if the housing project was built on that parcel), and
(3) the availability of other vacant land already zoned for multifamily use.
6. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
7. Id. at 395.
8. See, e.g., Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325, 328 (1927):
The Common Council of the city, upon these and other facts, concluded that
the public welfare would be promoted . . . and it is impossible for us to say that
their conclusion in that respect was clearly arbitrary and unreasonable . . . . In
such circumstances, the settled rule of this court is that it will not substitute its
judgment for that of the legislative body charged with the primary duty and
responsibility of determining the question.
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the motive for the choice or its secondary or tertiary effects.'
This state of affairs readily lent itself to abuse. Communities
would, out of a parochial motivation, use zoning powers to keep out
undesired classes of people (thus the term "exclusionary zoning").
Through such means as minimum floor area'" and lot size" require-
ments, a community could drive up housing costs and property
values and effectively price available housing out of the reach of low
income families. Ordinances totally excluding mobile homes, which
are sometimes the only source of good, new, inexpensive housing for
low to moderate income families, have been upheld." Additionally,
various restrictions on apartments, including limiting the number
of bedrooms (and thus limiting families with school age children),
and using apartments as buffer zones between single family zones
and commercial zones, have become nearly universal practices
which are subject to manipulation to provide exclusionary results. 3
The end result of such exclusionary zoning practices, of the
decades of laissez faire judicial attitudes in zoning matters, and of
other factors has been a critical shortage of low and moderate in-
come housing in the suburbs. 4 That shortage, in turn, has exacer-
9. See Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the
Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969); Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1645 (1971).
10. See, e.g., Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693
(1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953), upholding the validity of substantial minimum
floor space requirements.
11. See, e.g., Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952), sus-
taining a minimum lot size requirement of five acres as applied to 85 percent of a municipal-
ity. See generally D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW § 47
(1971).
12. Vickers v. Township Committee, 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 233 (1963). A vigorous dissent by Justice Hall, however, foreshadowed a changing judi-
cial attitude:
[Thel legitimate use of the zoning power . . . does not encompass the right to
erect barricades . . . where the real purpose is to prevent feared disruption with
a so-called chosen way of life. Nor does it encompass provisions designed to let
in as new residents only certain kinds of people, or those who can afford to live in
favored kinds of housing, or to keep down tax bills of present property owners.
When one of the above is the true situation . . . courts must not be hesitant to
strike down purely selfish and undemocratic enactments.
Id. at 264-65, 181 A.2d at 147 (footnote omitted).
13. See generally Babcock & Bosselman, Suburban Zoning and the Apartment Boom,
111 U. PA. L. REV. 1040 (1963), a dated but still useful and comprehensive article examining
the historic and the then current (1963) legal status of the multifamily dwelling, the reason
for the increased pressure for apartments outside the metropolitan area, and the reaction of
suburban communities to this pressure.
14. See Burns, Class Struggle in the Suburbs: Exclusionary Zoning Against the Poor, 2
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 179 (1975).
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bated the present unemployment crisis. Decaying central cities are
losing their tax base through the migration of industry and jobs to
the suburbs, leaving behind the low and moderate income workers
who cannot find housing in the suburbs within their reach and who
cannot afford to commute.'
Although judicial response was slow at first, the 1970's have
witnessed the beginnings of change in the traditional attitudes. In
Pennsylvania, for example, a number of decisions have invalidated
minimum lot size ordinances as not being related to the public
interest."6 The practice of permitting multifamily uses only by al-
lowing a variance (because none of the available land was zoned for
multifamily residences) has also been invalidated by the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court as an unreasonable use of the police power. 7
The New Jersey courts have also taken an active role in striking
down exclusionary zoning practices. Their efforts culminated in
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel," in which the New Jersey Supreme Court held that each
community has a duty to assume its fair share of the regional hous-
ing needs. That duty is based on the court's interpretation of "gen-
eral welfare""' as an affirmative requirement to which all zoning
regulations must conform, and as a term which includes regional as
well as local housing needs. Mount Laurel was therefore compelled
to take affirmative steps to alleviate the shortage of low-income
housing within its boundaries-a shortage due in large part to its
past economically discriminatory zoning practices. 0
15. Id.
16. In re Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); National Land and
Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). In the latter precedent-setting
decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated a four-acre minimum lot size require-
ment, announcing its policy that a township cannot "stand in the way of the natural forces
which send our growing population into hitherto undeveloped areas in search of a comfortable
place to live." Id. at 532, 215 A.2d at 612.
17. In re Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970). See also Township of Williston v.
Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 341 A.2d 466 (Pa. 1975), holding unconstitutional, on the basis of
Girsh, a zoning ordinance which limited apartment construction to only 80 of the nearly
12,000 acres in the township.
18. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975).
19. The Mount Laurel court was interpreting provisions of the New Jersey Constitution
and zoning enabling act. As the court noted, states are not prohibited from examining state
(or municipal) legislation on substantive due process grounds. Federal courts, on the other
hand, are limited by Ferguson v. Skupra, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), which essentially eliminated
substantive due process as a ground for holding state legislation unconstitutional. See also
North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drugstores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973).
20. See also Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283
A.2d 353 (1971), invalidating an entire zoning act which effectively excluded low and moder-
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While state courts have invalidated exclusionary zoning ordi-
nances on substantive due process and other grounds, federal deci-
sions have been based, for the most part, on the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Under the equal protection
clause, if an ordinance or zoning decision operates more harshly on
one class of people than on others, it may be found unconstitutional
unless the city can show a rational relationship of the ordinance to
a legitimate purpose-health, safety, morals, and general welfare.',
Furthermore, if the class discriminated against is one based on race,
the court must make a strict judicial scrutiny of the facts.22
Thus, where courts have found a statute to be racially discrimi-
natory on its face or in its effect, that statute has been invalidated
as a denial of equal protection.23 Additionally, courts have invalida-
ted ordinances and zoning decisions on the basis of racially
discriminatory motives where such ordinances and decisions also
had the effect of excluding minority members while not excluding
others. 4 However, the Supreme Court has said that a racially dis-
criminatory motive behind a statute is not in and of itself a violation
of equal protection. 5 The equal protection analysis of a zoning deci-
ate income families through minimum lot size and floor space requirements. The test, accord-
ing to the court, was whether the ordinance promoted a reasonably balanced and well-ordered
plan for the entire municipality, and whether it met both local housing needs and the fair
proportion of regional housing needs.
21. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). See generally Note,
supra note 9.
22. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944): "All legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to
say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them
to the most rigid scrutiny."
23. See, e.g., United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
24. United Farm Workers of Florida Housing Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493
F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding the city's refusal to permit a tie-in with the existing water
and sewer system as racially discriminatory against the minority farmworkers); Dailey v. City
of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970) (holding the denial of a rezoning request was
prompted by a desire to keep blacks from moving into the white area of a racially segregated
city); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y.), affd,
436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971) (holding the mayor's refusal,
in response to the discriminatory sentiments of the community, to grant the necessary permit
for a tie-in with the existing sewer system for a low-income housing project in an all-white
Boston suburb, denied plaintiff's equal housing opportunity under the equal protection clause
and the 1968 Fair Housing Act). See also Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (invalidat-
ing on equal protection grounds an amendment to the California State Constitution which
prohibited state interference with private restrictive covenants in housing. The Supreme
Court relied on the California Supreme Court's finding that the motive of the electorate was
to authorize private discrimination).
25. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
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sion must therefore concentrate on the differential treatment and
the discriminatory effect of that decision, although courts would be
hard pressed to ignore blatant racially discriminatory motivation.
The analysis of the equal protection issue becomes more com-
plex when, in addition to motive and effect, the nature of the gov-
ernmental action is considered. Should a relatively passive act (such
as a denial of rezoning) be differentiated from active government
participation (such as legislative enactment of an exclusionary zon-
ing ordinance)?"6 Although the answer is not yet entirely clear,
courts that have found a strong showing of racial discrimination in
the motive and effect factors have held that a refusal to act is a
denial of equal protection.2
Metropolitan Housing, however, is unique in the zoning area in
finding a violation of the equal protection clause through a refusal
to act, itself not discriminatory on its face,2" with no showing of
racially discriminatory motive," but with an ultimate effect, several
stages removed from the action, which perpetuates segregation. 0
The court's method of analysis in Metropolitan Housing in-
volved a four step process. First, the court placed the action in its
historical context. It cited various demographic data to conclude
that Arlington Heights is a nearly all-white suburb, where only
about one percent of its jobs are filled by blacks, and where most of
the blacks who do have jobs there are forced to commute from the
26. A further refinement in analysis is possible. Was there a refusal to act in an area
where there existed (and was followed) an administrative procedure to request government
action, as there was in the rezoning request in Metropolitan Housing; or was there a refusal
to act after, say, a citizen's or group's request without such a procedure being available? For
example, would the court have reached a different result if the same plaintiffs had petitioned
Arlington Heights to build a public housing project instead of requesting rezoning to build
their own? The racially discriminatory effect of the denial of that request would seem to be
no different than the effect of the denial of the rezoning request. Furthermore, the very idea
that the equal protection clause may require a community to acquire public housing is not
all that farfetched. In Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. City of Union City, 314
F. Supp. 967 (N.D. Cal. 1970), the court required the city to take all steps "necessary and
reasonably feasible" to accommodate the needs of its low income residents, including acquisi-
tion of public housing, if necessary.
27. See, e.g., cases cited in note 24 supra.
28. On the evidence, the trial court found that the rezoning request had been treated no
differently by the zoning board than other requests, and that the denial of the request was
based in part on the buffer policy.
29. At least, on the weight of the evidence, no such motive was shown.
30. An interesting analogy could be made to the school desegregation cases where the
courts have found a duty to act but where the line has been drawn at de jure segregation.
See note 40 infra.
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city because they cannot find housing near their jobs.3 Second, it
noted the crucial fact that "this suburb has not sponsored nor par-
ticipated in any low income housing developments, nor does the
record reflect any such plans for the future."3 Third, since 40 per-
cent of the eligible applicants for the proposed housing development
were black, the court found that the approval of the rezoning re-
quest would have resulted in a substantial increase in the village's
minority population. And fourth, the court stated that, since Metro-
politan was unable to find an economically feasible and suitable
alternative site," in all probability, no low income housing would be
built. In other words, the court saw the proposed housing develop-
ment as the only project presently contemplated to ease the de facto
segregation existing in Arlington Heights. The denial of the rezoning
request, therefore, operated to perpetuate segregation, thereby in-
voking application of the equal protection clause and, since a sus-
pect class was involved, the compelling state interest test. 4 That
test, developed under the Warren Court, required that a statute
which curtailed a "fundamental interest" or discriminated against
a "suspect class" must be based on a compelling state interest, and
further, the statute, as applied, must be necessary to further that
interest. Once a statute has been pigeon-holed within one of the two
factors and does not meet the resultant test, it will be held unconsti-
31. Although the court did not discuss other reasons for the low percentage of blacks in
jobs in Arlington Heights, it is not unreasonable to assume that lack of available housing may
be a major factor in a practically all-white suburb the size of Arlington Heights (over
70,000) in a metropolitan area the population of which is 18 percent black. Furthermore,
minority unemployment, although related to lack of available housing in the suburbs (see text
accompanying note 15 supra), is not the only criteria for invoking the court's protection if a
plaintiff's equal protection rights are being violated. The mere imbalance in available housing
may be sufficient in and of itself.
32. 517 F.2d at 414. It is difficult to see how crucial this factor really is unless there is
an affirmative duty to sponsor or participate in such developments. Although the court
appears to work under an assumption that such a duty exists, no authority or justification is
provided. Apparently, the duty is related to the court's attempt to break up white suburbia.
33. Although this was an important basis for its decision, the majority cites no evidence
in the record. This is particularly peculiar because the trial court had based its decision to
uphold the village's denial of the rezoning request in part on the fact that vacant land already
zoned R-5 was available to the plaintiff. 373 F. Supp. at 211. On the appellate level, dissent-
ing Chief Judge Fairchild, in reviewing the record, noted at least nine undeveloped tracts of
land in excess of 15 acres zoned R-5. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) requires an appellate court to
uphold a finding of fact by the trial court unless that finding was "clearly erroneous." Chief
Judge Fairchild could not say that the finding of the availability of alternative land was
clearly erroneous, and would, therefore, have affirmed the lower court.
34. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d
1179 (8th Cir. 1974). See generally Note, supra note 9.
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tutional under the equal protection clause.35 Having reached that
point, the court had no difficulty in finding that maintaining the
integrity of the zoning plan (buffer policy) and protecting neighbor-
hood property values did not constitute compelling justification.
Therefore, the denial of the rezoning request violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
If Metropolitan Housing remains good law, are zoning boards
and courts forced to apply the compelling state interest test to all
zoning disputes which ultimately are found to have racially discrim-
inatory effects? The test, it seems, is inappropriate for the delicate
task of weighing all the factors involved in resolving such disputes
equitably." One can hardly imagine an interest that could justify
discrimination on the basis of race, yet good city planning must be
more flexible than it would be if that which promotes integration
must be given priority over all other considerations (safety, health,
etc.). A straightforward balancing test may prove more desirable:
the housing opportunities offered lower income minorities by the
proposed project, in light of existing opportunities, needs, and alter-
natives, weighed against the legitimate interests of the community
in controlling growth in an orderly manner. The outcome in the
present case would likely be the same. The difficulties presented by
35. Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). Where neither "fundamental
interests" nor "suspect classes" are involved, the "rational basis test" is applied: the statute
must have some rational relationship to a legitimate state interest to meet equal protection
requirements.
36. As Metropolitan's proposed housing development was to be a cluster of two-story
townhouses no higher than surrounding single-family homes, with adequate open spaces, it
would be difficult to find any public interest sufficiently compelling to permit the racial
discrimination which resulted from the disapproval of such a project. A much more difficult
problem would be presented to the court if, instead of townhouses, the proposed project
consisted of high-rise apartments planted in an area of single-family homes. All other condi-
tions remaining equal, would maintaining the integrity of the zoning plan and protecting
neighboring property values then become compelling state interests? Would the added
traffic congestion and increased burden on the water and sewage systems be enough to
swing the decision the other way? It may well be that only when the property undeniably
cannot carry a higher density, will a compelling state interest be found. The court provides
no guidance, nor do other federal cases, where the balance is often tipped by one or two
factors.
While the compelling state interest test may be too blunt a weapon to fight exclusionary
zoning, the "rational basis test" is practically no test at all (see Note, supra note 10 and text
accompanying note 35, supra) as a rational basis can be found for almost all exclusionary
zoning practices. (Environmental facts are among the most popular reasons given by propo-
nents of such practices.) For a discussion of a "sliding scale of rationality tests" in the context
of a municipality's responsibility under federally assisted housing programs, see Note, The
United States Housing Act: Municipal Rights and the Equal Protection Clause, 50 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 711 (1975).
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the nearly insurmountable compelling state interest test, however,
would be ameliorated. Although lack of guidance and uniformity of
application could still pose problems, balancing equities is nothing
new to the courts, and the results would be far more justifiable than
the product of the application of the compelling state interest test
to every zoning question involving possible racially discriminatory
effects.
In addition to finding that the village's denial of the rezoning
request violated the equal protection clause, the Metropolitan
Housing court found that Arlington Heights has an "affirmative
duty" to alleviate the problem of segregated housing, whether or not
it helped to create the problem. Although it cited no authority for
this duty, some state courts have found, through a broad reading of
the term "general welfare," a duty to assume a fair share of the
regional (rather than just local) housing needs,37 and a duty to plan
for apartments if the community is located where apartment living
is in demand." Also, some federal courts have found, through equal
protection reasoning, that a city has a duty to take all necessary and
reasonably feasible steps to accommodate the needs of its low in-
come residents." The Metropolitan Housing court, however, limited
the village's duty to alleviating the racially segregated housing prob-
lem,4' a problem that arose, according to the court, through no fault
of the village.
If-the village does not take action itself (through, e.g., initiating
public housing projects), it is apparently subject to the compelling
state interest test each time it opposes a project that might alleviate
segregated conditions. The idea, of course, is to force it to take
action on its own; to enlist the cooperation of developers, of non-
37. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336
A.2d 713 (1975).
38. In re Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
39. Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. City of Union City, 314 F. Supp. 967
(N.D. Cal. 1970). See also Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp.
669 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
40. The court cited its own earlier decision in Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d
324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974), in which a builder of homes in black areas
was not permitted to exploit the prevailing market prices, inflated by the segregated housing
situation. But see Bell v. School City of Gary, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 924 (1964), holding a school board is not under a constitutional duty to take remedial
steps to correct the racial imbalance in the schools created by shifts in population, where the
school board, in establishing the district boundaries, has acted in good faith with no intention
or purpose of segregating students by race.
For an attack of the de jure-de facto distinction in school desegregation cases, see Justice
Powell's concurring opinion in Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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profit corporations organized to build low-income housing, and of
private landowners; to use low-cost leasing programs; and, if neces-
sary, to use its fiscal and eminent domain powers to build public
housing.' By taking action to provide for its share of the regional
low and moderate income housing needs, the community can plan
more logically and comprehensively for growth. By its inaction, it
becomes subject to court rulings which may force upon it little
islands of high intensity residential areas. Aggressive, affirmative
action may be the only insurance for maintaining local control over
zoning matters if Metropolitan Housing stands.
The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to
review Metropolitan Housing.2 A recent decision by that Court may
prove the plaintiffs' victory shortlived. Warth v. Seldin" held that
none of the plaintiffs, some of whom were in much the same position
as those in Metropolitan Housing, had standing to challenge the
allegedly exclusionary zoning ordinance of Penfield, New York.
That ordinance had designated 98 percent of the town's available
acreage for single-family dwellings and only three-tenths of one per-
cent for multifamily dwellings. The effect was to maintain a pre-
dominantly white, upper-class suburb. The only explanation for
denying standing to all plaintiffs, as Justice Brennan pointed out
in a stinging dissenting opinion, is "an indefensible hostility to the
claim on the merits."'44
Another indication of the Court's possible treatment of
Metropolitan Housing is its denial of certiorari to Construction In-
dustry Association v. Petaluma45 in which the Ninth Circuit upheld
an anti-growth ordinance limiting new housing construction to 500
units a year. Although a denial of certiorari is technically of no
41. These were some of the actions outlined in Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org.
v. City of Union City, 314 F. Supp. 967 (N.D. Cal. 1970). See note 27 supra.
42. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., cert. granted, 96
S. Ct. 560 (1975). Questions presented were:
(1) Does failure to grant rezoning request for multiple-family housing for low
and moderate income families in midst of single-family area violate Fourteenth
Amendment, even though Village was admittedly maintaining integrity of its
zoning plan and protecting neighborhood property values? (2) Does alleged dis-
criminatory housing pattern in Chicago metropolitan area impose upon suburban
municipality affirmative duty to ignore its admittedly proper zoning ordinance
to permit construction of multi-family low and moderate income housing?
44 U.S.L.W. 3323 (U.S. Nov. 25, 1975).
43. 95 S. Ct. 2197 (1975). See note 3 supra.
44. 95 S. Ct. at 2216.
45. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1148 (1976).
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precedential value, the Court's decision not to take the case has
been viewed as a silent endorsement of the anti-growth statute,
possibly resulting in a profusion of such statutes among smaller
communities in the near future."
If Warth and Petaluma are any indication of the Court's atti-
tude toward the merits of those cases, Metropolitan Housing may
well be reversed as a misapplication of the equal protection clause.
Such a reversal, however, would be a mistake and a serious blow to
the chances of equitable treatment of minority housing needs. What
is needed is guidance for communities and courts in the application
of equal protection to the zoning area-a topic the Court has not
directly addressed in the 50 years since Euclid.7 If communities are
to be able to plan effectively for their growth, especially for the
housing needs of those desiring to live in them, they cannot be
fettered by the compelling state interest test. At the same time, low
and moderate income classes, minority and otherwise, must be
planned for in those housing needs. The courts must therefore have
the tools to force communities to accept their fair share of the re-
gional housing needs when they do not do so on their own. The
Supreme Court's review of Metropolitan Housing is an excellent
opportunity to provide the necessary guidance to the lower courts.
RAYMOND M. PAETZOLD
The Right To Treatment Case-That Wasn't
In 1957 Kenneth Donaldson was civilly committed to a state
hospital in Chattahoochee, Florida for "care, maintenance, and
treatment" as a "paranoid schizophrenic."' For nearly 15 years
Donaldson demanded his release, claiming that he was neither dan-
gerous nor mentally ill, and that he was receiving no treatment. But
his requests for release were continually denied by the hospital su-
46. The Miami Herald, Feb. 25, 1976, § A, at 15, col. 1. See 5 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 485
(1975), noting Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal.
1974).
47. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
1. Donaldson, who had been suffering from delusions, was committed by his father
pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 394.22(11) (1955) (repealed by Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-131, effective
July 1, 1972). Essentially the Act provided that a mentally incompetent person who requires
confinement to prevent self-injury or violence to others should be committed for care, mainte-
nance and treatment.
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